This model discusses mobile network operators' (MNOs) incentives to invest in their network facilities such as new 4G networks under various regimes of data roaming charge regulation. Given an induced externality of investments (spillovers) due to the roaming agreements it will be shown that MNOs, competing on investments, widely set higher investments for below cost regulation of roaming charges. Otherwise, if MNOs are free to collaborate on investments, they set higher investment levels for above cost roaming charges. Both below-and above cost charges may be preferred from a welfare perspective. Furthermore, the paper discusses effects of the roaming charge regulation on roaming quality and MNOs' coverage.
Introduction
The telecommunications industry faces the transition from third generation (3G) to 4G networks such as Long-Term-Evolution networks (LTE) . "The boom in data traffic has caused mobile operators a lot of problems, because they need to invest in their existing 3G infrastructure and soon in new technologies like LTE and Wimax while maintaining parallel technologies like GSM (and in some cases CDMA)," says Uwe Steffen, the head of Nokia Siemens network's radio access solutions. The demand for mobile data traffic is persistently increasing throughout recent years. Global mobile data traffic Hitherto regulators tend to rely on operators to engage in negotiations to set a wholesale roaming price on each others' networks. Due to cross sharing of infrastructure the roaming charge for data services shows some similarities to widely analyzed two-way externalities in voice telecommunications. The effect of wholesale prices on competition and its regulation is extensively The optimal roaming charge assumes that roaming charges are set before investments take place. Clearly, a regulator may not credibly commit ex ante to regulated roaming charges before investment decisions of the networks.
However, without commitment a regulator may want to change roaming charges ex post. In this case, the optimal roaming charge would take investments as given. The common regulatory system of long run incremental costs is clearly designed to take investments consideration of networks into account. Moreover, given appropriate legal and regulatory institutions, commitment should be less of a problem.
Demand side
Consumers seek access to the mobile Internet while traveling in territory and have subscribed to one of two MNOs. MNOs compete in a territory along a line of a length normalized to 1. MNO 1's radio base station is located in the left part of the interval and MNO 2's base station is located in the right part of the interval. The coverage is taken as fixed in the base model. 5 MNO 1 serves an area of size α 1 and MNO 2 an area of size α 2 . It is assumed that there are no white spots which are not covered, moreover, there might be an overlap where both MNOs are active. Investments by MNO i enhance its own quality but due to the roaming policy also the perceived quality of the rival MNO j. Following Foros et al. (2002) , the total quality offered to consumers by MNO i can be written as The inverse demand faced by MNO i is given by
where p i indicates the subscription fee (for example, a monthly fee) and q i the total mobile traffic by subscribers of network i. In the presence of spillovers, investment in the infrastructure of MNO i enhances the willingness to pay for both MNOs.
Supply side
For creating mobile data services MNOs face the same constant per unit cost c at the wholesale level, any other costs at the retail level are normalized to zero. MNOs pay each other a roaming charge a for cross access whenever a subscriber of MNO i roams on the host network j. Roaming with data services generally differs from interconnection in telecommunications markets. In telecommunications markets interconnection refers to a two-way access problem where both provides have to interconnect to terminate calls and thus, pay each other a reciprocal interconnection (or termination) fee.
Roaming instead generally refers to a one-way problem, where one operator which does not operate in a respective territory uses the entire service of another operator which covers this territory. Therefore, the inactive operator pays the active operator a roaming fee (but not vice versa). In the present setup, both operators only partially cover the territory and have to pay a roaming charge to each other to full service in the entire area. Thus, the present might be labeled as double-one-way. 7 The roaming charge might be either regulated or negotiated by the networks. In the present model networks are symmetric and negotiate a reciprocal roaming charge. Finally, each network incurs a convex cost of investments of I(x i ) = 1 2 δx 2 i , where δ is a scale parameter of investment costs, which is assumed to be sufficiently large to allow for stable equilibria:
The critical values are derived below. The threshold value on investment costs (δ) guaranties equilibrium existence and interior solutions for the choice of the investment level and of the roaming charge. Without this assumption there might be an escalation of investments.
Retail market
It is assumed that MNOs have symmetrically patronized users in some previous stage to this game. In the third and last stage the networks competeà 7 This labeling refers to an anonymous referee. 
Users are perfectly mobile within the entire market (of length 1) and seek access to the mobile Internet. The probability of being served by the sub- Equilibrium quantities 8 are obtained as
Inserting equilibrium quantities into the demand function of Eq. (2) yields equilibrium subscription prices of
The equilibrium retail quantity is decreasing in the roaming charge a, that is,
By increasing the cost of roaming, MNOs will decrease their quantity supplied to increase the price in the retail market. Hence, there will be an incentive to collude on the roaming charge to decrease quantities and increase profits. This is in line with the early literature on mobile communications (Armstrong, 1998; Laffont et al., 1998; Carter & Wright, 1999) , 8 The second order condition of The model compares three different regulatory regimes: Cost-based regulation, above-cost regulation, and below-cost regulation. These regimes are compared to an outcome where providers are free to engage in negotiation over the roaming charge.
In the second stage MNOs determine their optimal investment level either noncooperatively by maximizing individual profits Π i or jointly by maximizing Π = Π i + Π j with respect to investment levels, where
9 With non-linear tariffs (for example, two-part tariffs) the problem of tacit collusion via access prices is reduced, since an increase in the linear price is compensated by a reduction of the fixed fee (see Armstrong, 1998; Laffont et al., 1998) . Another strand of literature shows that networks may wish to coordinate on access prices below marginal costs if networks compete with two-part tariffs and price discriminate between on-net and off-net calls (Gans & King, 2001 ), or demand for subscription is elastic (Dessein, 2003) . If not only the carrier but also the receiver benefits from calls Hermalin and Katz (2010) provide theoretical arguments for both access pricing above and below costs. 
Roaming charge regulated at costs
Suppose that the roaming charge is regulated to the marginal cost of providing mobile Internet services, that is, a = c. At stage 2 networks maximize their profits of Eq. (3) either individually or jointly. If both networks set their investment levels noncooperatively there exists a unique 10 (and symmetric) solution satisfying
When both networks choose investments cooperatively, they maximize their joint profit Π with respect to x i and x j , which yields a unique 11 equilibrium investment level of 10 For the SOC to hold it has to be ensured that the costs of investments are sufficiently convex, that is, δ >δ = 2 9 (β − 2) 2 . 11 In the cooperative setting, for the SOC to hold, it has to be assumed that δ >δ = 2 9
(5 + 5β 2 − 8β). This constitutes the second part of the above assumption, asδ >δ.
Roaming charge not regulated at costs
The more interesting case is a non-cost based regulation of roaming charges.
Roaming charges can only be set at costs if a regulator knows demand and cost parameters. Although some sophisticated engineering network models are available, it is contentious in practice that a regulator can exactly set roaming charges at costs. Similar arguments hold for setting roaming charges above or below costs, though, except the regulator favors a roaming charge of zero. 12
Suppose the roaming charge is not regulated at costs. With competition at the investment stage MNOs set investment levels of
whereas they jointly set investment levels of
When the roaming charge is regulated to the cost of providing mobile Internet service, MNOs do not take account of rival's demand in the roaming market, as the profit in Eq. (6) simply reduces to
2 δx 2 i . MNOs just balance the previously mentioned effects in the retail market.
When incorporating roaming profits or deficits, though, MNOs have to take account of the induced demand of rival customers, which generates a profit or deficit from roaming depending on the regulation regime.
Joint investments
Consider that MNOs collaborate on investments. In a symmetric equilibrium, MNOs set investment levels of x i = x j = x, retail prices read as
12 See section 5.
Retail prices are unambiguously increasing in investments, that is, ∂p i ∂x > 0 since subscribers' willingness to pay is increased. For an above cost roaming charge providers both benefit from higher retail prices and from an access markup in the roaming market and thus are willing to invest to enhance revenues in both markets.
However, below cost roaming charges lead to opposing effects. For larger investments fellow subscribers are more willing to pay, enabling providers to set higher prices in the retail market. However, also rival subscribers' willingness to pay is increased, leading to more roaming traffic by rival subscribers and thus to a deficit from each rival subscriber. Now, if MNOs jointly set investments they will perfectly internalize the effect of their investment on rival's demand. Simply observe from Eq. (10) 
Competition on investments
In case MNOs compete over investment levels they do not take account for the effect of their investment on the rival's demand. Hence, according to Eq. (9), the previous effects of above-and below cost roaming regulation may be reversed. For any investment spillover of β < 14 The other parameters are set to: α = 0.75; c = 1; δ = 3; v = 2.
Negotiation over the roaming charge
Currently, many regulatory authorities tend to rely on operators to engage in negotiations to set a wholesale roaming price on each others' networks.
The FCC recently required all wireless carriers to let customers of competing MNO's roam on their network. The mandate forces companies to reach at commercially reasonable terms for their roaming agreements, but the FCC doesn't itself set fees at this stage. Suppose providers negotiate over the roaming charge at stage 1 of the game. (6) this, however, reduces the benefit of above cost charges. Otherwise, if the investment spillover is sufficiently large, that is, β > 7 8 , investments push q i and q j in the above equation relative symmetrically, thus, the effects in the roaming market become relatively unimportant compared to the retail market and providers would be more willing to invest. In equilibrium, the investment-reduction effect dominates, though. The competitive investment level is denoted as
To the contrary, if MNOs jointly set investment, an above cost roaming charge enhances investments unambiguously (see Eq. (10)) since MNOs are able to internalize the entire gain of an above-cost charge. Obviously, if they further jointly determine the roaming charge, they set a roaming 15 charge above costs and so their profit maximizing investment level is given by
That is, if networks are free to engage in negotiations over the roaming charge they set larger investment levels in case they are also free to jointly determine investment levels, since
(1 + β), which holds given assumption 1. This is a quite interesting result from a competition policy and social welfare perspective. The above results imply, that if MNOs are free to negotiate an above cost roaming charge, an authority should also allow them to collaborate rather than to compete on investments. The question remains, how a benevolent social planner would ideally set roaming charges and investment levels.
Welfare analysis
The discussion above implies an important influence of roaming charges in order to enhance MNOs' incentives to investment. Given that it is in the interest of a regulator to encourage investments -which will be shown is the case -the authorities have to take account of both spillovers on investment and roaming charges.
Define total welfare as the sum of consumers' surplus (CS) and provider's profits, that is,
with
In the symmetric environment MNOs set quantities in equilibrium as
Hence, investments enhance consumer surplus. This simplifies the welfare analysis with respect to joint investments. Whenever joint investments increase retail quantities it should be preferred from a welfare perspective, as any joint decision naturally also increases MNOs' profits.
Taking into account MNOs' profits, due to the convexity of investments cost, there exists a welfare maximizing investment level 15 which solves
given as
To induce social optimal investments the social planner sets a below-cost roaming charge 16 by solving ∂W ∂a = 0 of
For marginal cost low enough the optimal roaming charge would be zero, since it cannot be negative.
A direct comparison of the social optimal investment level of (17) and the private optimal investment levels of Eqs. (13) and (12) yields that free negotiations over the roaming charge leads to a social underprovision of investments, that is,
In the present setup free negotiations over the roaming charge, which, for example, is proposed by the FCC, run against the public interest. The divergence between the social and private optimal roaming charge and the resulting divergence in investment levels may serve as a rational for a regulatory intervention. It is unlikely in practice, however, that a regulator may directly influence MNOs' investments. It seems to be more relevant that a regulator may indirectly affect MNOs' investment levels by regulating the roaming charge below a cost level. Since the exact marginal costs of providing mobile Internet services are difficult to calculate, it seems to be a practical solution to implement zero charges, which the European Commission proposes in the long run for mobile voice communications services.
A comparison of the jointly and competitively determined investment levels of Eqs. (9) and (10) clearly shows that roaming charge regulation to 15 The SOC of (1 + β) 2 , which holds given the restriction on δ. 16 The SOC of
(1 + β) 2 , which constitutes the first part of the restriction on δ. 17 Valletti and Cambini (2005) also provide an underinvestment feature if firms are left to negotiate a reciprocal access charge above cost. In the setting of Jeon and Hurkens (2008) firms reach a social optimal investment level for a cost-based access charge.
marginal costs, that is, a = c, leads to underprovision in the present model.
A roaming charge of zero will further decrease joint investments levels, which leads to an even more severe social underprovision of investments.
However, if MNOs compete on investment levels, a roaming charge below marginal costs induce MNOs to increase their investment levels, given that the investment spillover is not too large (β < 7 8 ). From a welfare perspective, a zero roaming charge regime may both lead to over-and underprovision as For low investment spillovers, MNOs' investments rarely affect rival consumers' willingness to pay. The positive effect on total demand and profits becomes relatively weak compared to the negative market share effect. As competition for market shares becomes relatively more important, this leads MNOs to engage in a race for investment which may even lead to overinvestment from a welfare perspective.
The different regimes of cooperative and noncooperative determination of investments demand a careful regulation of the roaming charge to reach socially preferred investment levels. With competition on investments in network infrastructure, a roaming charge below marginal costs widely encourage investments, where the opposite holds with joint investments. Thus, a regulator may both set a roaming charge below and above costs to reach an investment level, that is preferred from a welfare perspective.
Extensions
This section provides two extensions to the base model where providers additionally decide on the roaming quality and on coverage.
Roaming quality
This section allows MNOs to additionally decide on their optimal roaming quality (β). Networks may strategically determine the quality of data traffic of rival customers when roaming in their networks, for example, by downgrading the speed of interconnection compared to the speed offered by fellow subscribers.
Since a regulator can credibly commit on the regulation regime, the roaming quality is chosen after regulation is announced and before infrastructure investment takes place. The following sections analyze the impact of the roaming charge regulation on the MNOs' decision to invest in the roaming quality. To restrict the number of possible cases it is assumed that both infrastructure investments and roaming quality are either determined cooperatively or noncooperatively instead of a mixture of both decisions. 19 
Competition on roaming quality
Inserting the optimal retail quantity of Eq. (4) into the profit function of Eq. (3) yields the equilibrium retail profit, depending on the symmetric investment levels x i = x j = x * at the previous stage of
Suppose MNOs compete on investments. Differentiation with respect to β implicitly determines the choice of the optimal roaming quality by
To determine the optimal choice of β it is checked how infrastructure investments are affected.
Differentiation of Eq. (9) yields that the sign of ∂x * ∂β is determined by
Since investment costs are assumed to be sufficiently convex (δ is large), the first part of the equation is negative whereas the sign of the second part depends on the regime of the roaming charge regulation. For a ≤ c the second part is also negative, whereas it turns positive for a markup on marginal costs of a > c. In this case it depends on the level of the markup if the second positive effect outweighs the negative first one, so investments might increase in the roaming quality. In either case, investment levels are higher the higher the roaming charge. Hence, the regime of regulation determines MNOs' choice of the roaming quality. Simple observation of Eq. (20) shows that the impact on investment levels determines the optimal choice of the roaming quality.
The exact choice of the roaming quality depends on the convexity of the cost function. If MNOs face a deficit from roaming there are less incentives to increase the roaming quality. Being regulated below the cost of providing services MNOs face a deficit from roaming per rival subscriber. Now, an increase in the roaming quality increases the amount of roaming, and in turn the loss from roaming. The only incentive to increase the quality of roaming is due to the increase in the willingness to pay of fellow subscribers.
Otherwise, if MNOs sufficiently benefit from roaming, they may even choose the maximal roaming quality. In case of a markup on costs they both benefit from an increased willingness to pay of fellow and rival subscribers. Consider for example parameter values of v = 3, δ = 4, c = 1, and α = 0.75.
With a roaming charge of zero MNOs set a roaming quality of β = 0.89, with cost-based regulation they set β = 0.98, whereas they would set the maximal roaming quality of β = 1 for a 12% markup on the costs.
Collusion on roaming quality
Consider MNOs collaborate on investments and the quality of roaming. Simple observation of Eq. (10) shows that the infrastructure investment levels are unambiguously increasing in the roaming quality, independent of the type of roaming charge regulation. Contrary to competition on investment, the incentives to invest are higher the higher the roaming quality.
MNOs maximize their equilibrium profit with respect to the roaming quality, which reads as
Observe that the derivative is increasing over the interval of β ∈ leads to the incentive to set a lower roaming quality. Now, if a regulatory authority wishes to enhance both investments and the quality of spillovers it might face a dilemma. As previously shown, competing MNOs increase investment levels for a roaming charge below cost (if spillovers are not too large), although in this case they set a lower roaming quality. Otherwise, for roaming charges above costs they set a better roaming quality, but set lower investment levels.
Proposition 3. If MNOs jointly set investment levels and the roaming quality, investment levels are increasing in the roaming quality and MNOs always choose the maximal roaming quality, independent of the regulatory regime.
If MNOs compete on investment levels and the roaming quality investment levels are decreasing in the quality of roaming for a roaming charge at or below costs, whereas investments may increase for a sufficiently high markup.
MNOs choose a higher roaming quality, the higher the regulated roaming charge.
Coverage competition
The base model above treated MNOs' coverage as symmetrically given. This section analyzes the effect of an increase in coverage locally around symmetric coverage. The decision takes place after the regulation policy (a) is announced but before MNOs set infrastructure levels. For ease of exposition of analytical expressions the roaming quality parameter β is set to one henceforth. 20 Providers incur no cost of coverage. This (extreme) assumption allows to focus on providers' strategic reasons to provide coverage.
It turns out that providers' coverage decisions are qualitatively unaffected by whether they set infrastructure investments in the preceding stage competitively or jointly, hence the following analytical expressions refer to the case providers compete on infrastructure investments in the preceding stage.
The expressions for the case of joint infrastructure investments are relegated to the appendix.
Starting from symmetric coverage a provider's profit derivative with respect to its coverage is denoted as
Directly observe that for cost based regulation of a = c every symmetric 20 The analysis has been repeated for various parameters of β and led to similar results.
22
coverage is a Nash equilibrium. This is in line with Fabrizi and Wertlen (2008) who find that in the absence of sharing agreements any combination of coverage leading to full coverage in a Nash equilibrium.
For below cost regulation of a < c it follows that ∆ > 0 21 and thus,
For a below cost regulation a MNO's profit is locally decreasing in its coverage, hence it will not engage in expanding its coverage but rather shut down infrastructure if feasible. This would induce more fellow subscribers to roam on the rival's network and so the respective provider would save its operation cost c and only pays a roaming charge of a < c.
Fabrizi and Wertlen (2008) also find that providers will not engage in expanding in overlapping territories. In their model, however, the result is due to maximization of roaming rents due to a negotiated above cost roaming charge, whereas in the present model the motivation relies on a cost saving argument due to a below cost charge.
For above cost regulation providers (locally) either have an incentive to expand or lower their served territory, since If the roaming charge is only slightly set above costs the effect in the retail market dominates and providers have an incentive to increase coverage, otherwise, for higher charges providers benefit from roaming income per subscriber and have an incentive to set the lowest possible coverage to benefit from the roaming rents. Take for example parameter values of v = 3, c = 2, δ = 3, and α i = 0.7. As long as the markup on costs is less than approx. 3 % providers locally increase coverage, otherwise they locally decrease coverage. 21 Following assumption 1 it holds that δ > 2 for β = 1.
Conclusion
Due to the widespread use of smartphones in recent years, MNOs have to discover new infrastructure models to meet the demand for third generation (3G) and to rollout 4G networks. Likewise the transition from 2G to 3G also in an early stage of the rollout of 4G providers tend to engage in network sharing and collaborations on infrastructure investments. From a competition policy perspective it is a relevant policy question whether MNOs should be allowed to collaborate in the investment stage and if and how to regulate network sharing. The results of the paper imply that MNOs' incentives to invest depend on: i) the regime of roaming charge regulation, ii) on the choice whether to allow MNOs to collaborate on investment levels, and iii) on the extent of the investment spillover. Providers prefer an above cost roaming charge, whereas a social planner prefers a below cost charge, which however, might both lead to over-and underinvestments from a social point of view.
The paper provides two extensions to the base model where providers are free to determine the roaming quality and their coverage. MNOs will choose maximal roaming quality whenever they are free to collaborate on investments and quality. However, if MNOs compete on investments and the roaming quality, the social planner might face a dilemma. For below cost charges MNOs increase investment levels but decrease the roaming quality, whereas for above cost charges they decrease investment levels but increase the roaming quality. The effect of roaming charges on coverage turns out to be ambiguous and depends on the relative magnitude in the retail and the roaming market.
The model is very stylized and is one attempt to capture the impact of roaming charges on strategic interactions among competing providers. It is able to show that the level of roaming charges might quite diversely affect MNOs' choices on investments, quality, and coverage. Although, there is clearly room for further developing and putting more structure to the 
